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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of the last few decades resulted in an 
increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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1. Introduction: issues of definition 
 
If ways of promoting accountability are to be discussed with reference to the Arab 
region, certain basic features of the region's political economy need to be established 
at the outset. It is against the parameters set by these features that terms such as 
"accountability", "disadvantage" and "civil society" need to be understood. It is 
likewise against these parameters that the appropriateness and effectiveness of civil 
society efforts to increase accountability on behalf of the disadvantaged can be 
assessed. This introductory section considers some key overarching economic and 





"No taxation without representation" is an adage frequently applied in reverse to Arab 
states. Where goods, services and income are distributed to citizens, but tax is either 
not collected or is collected inefficiently or selectively, consensus may be achieved by 
means other than democratic legitimation.
1 In economies where state revenues derive 
not from personal income tax but from oil rents (as in Gulf countries, Libya, Syria and 
Algeria) or security rents (via US and EU financial backing for Egypt, Jordan and 
other Mediterranean states), governments are seen to lack what one analyst has called 
the "organic, albeit adversarial, links with their citizens that taxation is believed to 
bring about".
2 It is also the case, however, that — in the long term — both oil rents 
and security rents in the region are on a declining trend, leading some economists to 
suggest that rentier states may behave like so-called production states after all in 
exhibiting a link between income and accountability. In other words, if the absence of 
tax extractions from citizens means that the incentive for citizens to demand a voice in 
government is also absent, it may be that a reduction in rents will lead to a reduction 
in welfare and other entitlements and ultimately have the same impact as an increase 
in tax.
3 Either way, accountability in Arab states would seem to be intrinsically linked 
to the fortunes of their rentier economies. 
 
In practical terms, citizens in the majority of Arab states have not only lacked 
representation but have been actively denied the means of holding their governments 
to account. This has been achieved through legislation empowering heads of state to 
rule by decree. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the 1992 Basic Law enshrined the 
absolute authority of the king. In Egypt and Syria, State of Emergency laws have been 
used for decades to override constitutional guarantees of citizens' rights. Emergency 
                                                           
1 Giacomo Luciani, 1994, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization", in 
Ghassan Salamé (ed), Democracy without Democrats, London: I B Tauris, p 132 
2 John Waterbury,  1994, "Democracy without Democrats: the Potential for Political Liberalization in 
the Middle East", Ghassan Salamé (ed) op.cit., pp. 29-30 
3 Augustus Richard Norton, 1997, "Political Reform in the Middle East", in Laura Guazzone (ed), The 
Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, p 11.   4
laws confer powers of censorship and arbitrary arrest and detention and authorise the 
use of special security courts whose verdicts are not subject to appeal.
4 Legislative 
elections held under these laws cannot be free or fair. Jordan was ruled under martial 
law from 1957 to 1989, since when emergency-style curbs on political rights have 
been invoked periodically.
5 Algeria introduced a State of Emergency Law in 1992. 
Those who rule by emergency legislation justify their actions by reference to security 
threats, whether external (from Israel) or internal (from opposition groups). Yet the 
enforcement of emergency laws in itself creates the conditions in which opposition 
groups become a threat to stability, because they are denied peaceful routes to 
expressing dissent. At the same time, states that are party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Syria) 
disregard their accountability to the international community by contravening the 
terms of the Covenant, especially Article 4(1) which limits the use of emergency laws.  
 
1.2  Disadvantaged groups 
 
One route to measuring disadvantage in Arab societies is to think of it as being multi-
layered. Clearly, where civil and political rights are denied to whole populations, 
disadvantage becomes a relative term, with other forms of disadvantage being 
additional to the civil and political ones. Women, for instance, have been said to 
experience a particular form of "double jeopardy".
6 Where family law defines women 
as wards of their male relatives and prevents them from entering employment or 
travelling without a man's permission, they suffer the same limitations set on male 
civic and political participation but are additionally denied full juridical status.
7 
Migrants may also find themselves at a disadvantage, especially in Gulf states, where 
non-nationals are increasingly being excluded from free welfare provision. Minorities 
face various types of disadvantage in different states. In Kuwait, more than 100,000 
stateless Arabs, known as bedoon because they are bedoon jinsiya (without 
nationality), do not have citizenship. even though they have lived in the country for 
generations. Neither women nor bedoon have the right to vote in, or run for, elections 
to the Kuwaiti National Assembly; this right is restricted to males who are Kuwaiti by 
birth or have been naturalised for 20 years. Syrian Kurds, who account for 8-10 per 
cent of Syria's population, have been subjected to systematic denial of nationality and 
citizenship rights since the 1960s.
8 Algeria's ethnic Berbers account for around 30 per 
cent of the population, but the government in Algiers has refused to recognise 
Tamazight as their official language on a par with Arabic, and security forces have 
been deployed to clamp down harshly on Berber unrest.
9 In Egypt, Coptic Christians 
                                                           
4 For details of the Emergency Law in Egypt, see Amnesty International, 2000, Muzzling Civil Society, 
London: September. For Syria see ARTICLE 19, Walls of Silence: Media and Censorship in Syria, 
London 1998, pp 21-24. 
5 See Naomi Sakr, 2001, "Media Reform in Jordan: the Stop-Go Transition", in B. Rozumilowicz, S. 
Verhulst and M. Price (eds), Media Reform: Democratizing Media, Democratizing the State, London: 
Routledge, pp 107-132 
6 Deniz Kandiyoti uses this expression in her foreword to Suad Joseph (ed), 2000, Gender and 
Citizenship in the Middle East, New York: Syracuse University Press, p xiv 
7 The dozen Arab states that have signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) have placed reservations on key articles of the convention. 
See Naomi Sakr/CMF MENA, 2000, Women's Rights and the Arab Media, London: CMF-MENA, p 4.  
8 See Human Rights Watch,  1996, Vol 8 No 4 (E), The Silenced Kurds, London and New York,and  
ARTICLE 19, Walls of Silence, pp 77-78 
9 Middle East Economic Digest, "Government rocked by Kabylie riots", 11 May, 2001, p 3   5
comprise 6-10 per cent of the population, Research suggests that they own 22 per cent 
of the country's wealth but hold only 1.5 per cent of official positions.
10  
 
Economic disadvantage has been foist on many people in the Arab world, in the form 
of deliberate and systematic impoverishment. Sometimes this has been a result of 
governments penalising dissidents and their entire extended families by denying them 
jobs or pensions. In some more visible cases, whole countries or communities have 
been subjected to economic blockades. Palestinians have lost their lands and 
livelihoods over the past half century by being turned into refuguees, but their 
situation has worsened further in the past ten years. During this time hundreds of 
thousands lost jobs in the Gulf after Iraq invaded Kuwait. From 1993 onwards, Israeli 
"closures" repeatedly blocked the movement of people and goods between Israel and 
the Occupied Territories and between the West Bank and Gaza. The effect of a decade 
of international sanctions on Iraq can be gauged from UNDP data on infant mortality 
which, in stark contrast to the global trend, was higher in 1998 than in 1970.
11 Two 
co-ordinators of UN humanitarian assistance to Iraq have resigned their posts in 
protest at the human cost of sanctions.
12  These forms of disadvantage have 
galvanised people across the Arab region to seek to hold Arab leaders and the 
international community collectively to account for the injustice experienced by 
ordinary Palestinians and Iraqis through no fault of their own.  
 
A further form of disadvantage that has major implications for regional civil society 
and the media is an educational one. The level of illiteracy across Arab states remains 
high, especially among women but also among young people aged 15 to 24. In 1999, 
average adult literacy in the Arab region was 61.3 per cent, while average youth 
literacy was 78.4 per cent.
13 Female literacy is lowest in Yemen, at around 23 per 
cent, followed by Morocco, at around 34 per cent, but rates of only 40-60 per cent are 
to be found in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Oman, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia.   
 
1.3  Civil society 
 
It follows from the heavy legal and practical constraints on freedom of association and 
expression outlined in the preceding sections that civil society is a problematic 
category in the Arab world. When the state retains a tight grip over traditional and 
modern institutions and the means of production, a corollary of its strength is a weak 
civil society.
14 It has also been argued that civil society did not exist as such in Arab 
states, even before the rise of the strong state, because the organisation of agricultural, 
artisanal and commercial activities, being based on clan membership, was 
incompatible with notions of citizenship inherent in the term "civil society".
15 
                                                           
10 Unofficial study by Sulaiman Shafiq,  cited by Steve Negus, "Discrimination against…?", Middle 
East International, No 619, 25 February, 2000, p 14 
11 The rate rose from 90 deaths per 1000 live births in 1970 to 103 in 1998, See UNDP, Human 
Development Report 2000, p 188. The sparse comparative data for Iraq contained in that report also 
show the number of fixed telephone lines to have decreased over the decade. Iraq has been omitted 
altogether from the Human Development Report 2001.  
12 Denis Halliday in 1998 and Hans von Sponeck in 2000  
13 UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, p 177 
14 See for example Halim Barakat, 1993, The Arab World: Society, Culture and the State, Berkeley, Ca: 
University of California Press, p 278 
15 Isam Khafaji, 1994, "Beyond the Ultra-Nationalist State", Middle East Report, No 187-188, Vol 24, 
No. 2-3, p 37   6
Weakness and an internal lack of civility are two persistent features that affect Arab 
civil society's ability to hold power-holders to account. 
 
The institutional weakness of voluntary associations, pressure groups and non-
governmental organisations in Arab countries can be attributed to laws depriving them 
of autonomy, combined with modes of interest representation that have all the 
monopolistic, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally-differentiated 
hallmarks of state corporatism.
16 In circumstances where any activity, from publishing 
to running a youth club or charity, can be conducted legally only if it has been 
formally licensed by the state, activities that international norms classify as the 
prerogative of civil society depend instead on state approval and remain permanently 
subject to state interference. Fund-raising is particularly closely controlled. A whole 
range of bodies that are assumed in other contexts to be part of civil society — such as 
universities or trade unions — can hardly be described as such when their most 
influential personnel are appointed by the head of state. Ambiguities arising from this 
lack of autonomy contribute to a lack of interest in pluralism among would-be civil 
society groups. As the survival of voluntary, non-profit ventures is contingent and 
uncertain, survival becomes an objective in its own right, leading to a tendency for 
some groups to seek freedom of association and expression for themselves but not for 
others.  This is particularly, but not exclusively, true of those associations that espouse 
codes of conduct derived from a particularly puritanical interpretation of Islam, which 
have little in common with liberal or universalist approaches to fundamental freedoms 
and human rights. The growth of such groups in the Gulf during the 1980s influenced 
expatriate Arabs working in Gulf countries, who took these ideologies back home 




2. Evolution of civil society and media over the past ten years 
 
2.1 Political background  
 
In countries where the exercise of power is highly centralised, both functionally and 
geographically, the best hope for civil society to push for accountability is by taking 
advantage of any checks and balances that may exist through the separation of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. Generalisation about the extent of such 
separation across the Arab world is hazardous, but it can be said that developments 
with regard to the separation of powers over the past ten years have not worked in 
favour of civil society.  
 
Signs of movement on this front in the Gulf over the past ten years have been brought 
about through external as well as internal pressure. For example, after the US-led 
military coalition expelled Iraqi occupying forces from Kuwait in 1991, Arab 
governments in Gulf states were advised that they should be seen to be consulting 
their people. Kuwait's elected National Assembly was reconvened.  Bahrain appointed 
a Consultative Council to replace the elected National Assembly dissolved in 1975. 
Saudi Arabia's appointed Consultative Council, established under the Basic Law of 
                                                           
16 These criteria of state corporatism are derived from Philippe Schmitter's classic definition in "Still 
the Century of Corporatism?", in F. B Pike and T Stritch (eds), The New Corporatism: Socio-Political 
Structures in the Iberian World, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974, pp 93-94   7
1992, came into being in 1993. The first elections to Oman's Cconsultative Council 
took place in 1997. The Emir who came to power in a palace coup in Qatar in 1995 
was more ambitious; he ordered municipal elections and in 1999 launched 
preparations for creating an elected parliament for Qatar. This set a precedent for 
Bahrain to follow when its new Emir took over in 1999. 
 
Meanwhile a reverse trend towards de-liberalisation was under way in North Africa, 
reinforced by events in Algeria in and after 1992. Algeria's 1989 constitution 
introduced multi-party politics to replace the country's one-party state, but the army 
did not allow elections to take their course. Fearing victory by an Islamist party, the 
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), it intervened to depose the president, cancel the 
elections and ban the FIS. Algeria descended into brutal and bloody civil strife, 
spreading fears of a similar spiral of violence elsewhere. The Egyptian and Tunisian 
governments responded by penalising non-violent Islamist groups for the terrorist acts 
of a small number of extremists who had returned from fighting in Afghanistan. In an 
attempt to repress all forms of Islamist opposition they used military courts to try 
civilians, thereby avoiding entanglement with the judiciary. Governments imposed 
their own appointees on professional syndicates, universities, municipal councils and 
other bodies where officials were previously elected. Nothing was left to chance in 
general elections, so that ruling parties were returned with 90 per cent or more of 
parliamentary seats. 
 
In the eastern Mediterranean, other dynamics were at work. Despite the demise of its 
long-standing backer, the Soviet Union, and the collapse of authoritarian regimes in 
eastern and central Europe, one of the Arab world's harshest authoritarian regimes 
clung to power in Syria, with little fundamental change in evidence even after the 
transfer of power from Hafez al-Asad to his son Bashar in 1999 (see Section 3.2.2). 
The Syrian government and its military intelligence forces retained ultimate control 
over domestic politics in Lebanon as the latter embarked on reconstruction after its 
1975-90 civil war. A Defence and Security Agreement signed between Syria and 
Lebanon in 1991 required the Syrian and Lebanese military and security authorities to 




In theory, the powers of the Palestinian Authority that took control of a small amount 
of land in the West Bank and Gaza in the mid-1990s should have been constrained 
under the terms of the Basic Law, passed (but not ratified) in 1997. In practice the 
elected Palestinian Legislative Council was sidelined and, instead of Palestinian 
municipal elections taking place as scheduled in 1998, municipal councils were 
appointed. Political liberalisation that took place in Jordan between 1989 and 1993 
came to an abrupt halt after the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, as the 
government sought to silence the treaty's opponents through curbs on freedom of 
expression and assembly. Judicial challenges to these curbs were overcome through 
fresh legislation passed by the quiescent parliament formed after opposition parties 
boycotted the 1997 elections in protest at government controls.  
 
Meanwhile, unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 brought with it a period of 
liberalisation culminating in multi-party elections in 1993. But the civil war that 
                                                           
17 ARTICLE 19, 1998, Walls of Silence: Media and Censorship in Syria, London, pp 59-60   8
followed in 1994 brought victory to conservative traditionalist forces who used a 
combination of laws and extra-judicial means to harass and intimidate opposition 
parties and intellectuals. In 2000, the Yemeni parliament approved constitutional 
amendments to extend its own life from four to six years and the president's tenure 
from five to seven years. 
 
2.2 Shifts in the media landscape 
 
Laws controlling the media in Arab states are strict enough to minimise the use of 
media as a means of pursuing issues of disadvantage and accountability. While 
"censorship" is an appropriate description of the effect of these laws, it is important to 
recognise that censorship is achieved not only through direct supression of content but 
also by more fundamental and less visible means, including regulation of media 
ownership, regulation of entry to the journalistic profession and regulation of printing 
and distribution, as well as extra-judicial attacks on media practitioners and bars on 
access to information. Thus the Egyptian government, for example, may say the 
country has a "free press", because opposition parties are permitted to publish 
newspapers alongside the government-owned dailies. Yet analysis of Egyptian media 
laws, which are reasonably typical of those in effect throughout the region, reveals 
that — even setting aside the State of Emergency Law —the media are anything but 
free.  
 
By law, the state has a monopoly over radio and television broadcasting which is to be 
exercised by a national agency supervised by the minister of information (in other 
words, a member of the executive branch of government). By law, individuals are not 
allowed to own newspapers. Corporate entities seeking to publish must apply to a 
government-appointed body for a licence, putting up a bank deposit of £E1 million for 
a daily newspaper. Political party newspapers are allowed under the law on political 
parties, but the same law makes the licensing of parties subject to vetting by a 
committee whose membership is controlled by the president of the republic (himself 
the head of the ruling political party), whose members must include three government 
ministers and which is only considered quorate when those ministers are present. 
Printing and distribution of opposition newspapers is conducted by printing houses 
belonging to the main government-owned dailies; other printing takes place in a so-
called free zone where entry and exit of goods is government-controlled. Journalists 
cannot choose which union to belong to. By law, if they are not full members of the 
one and only Journalists' Syndicate, whose operations and membership are legally 
subject to government interference, they may not work as journalists or be hired by 
any publisher or news agency.   
 
All these restrictions exist alongisde the multiple layers of legislation that directly 
criminalise free speech. These layers are formed by the Penal Code, the Press Law 
and laws governing the content and screening of films, videos, books and stage plays. 
Thus a drama shown on television will have been through four censorship barriers. If 
it is published first as a book, it will be censored before publication. If it then becomes 
a stage play or film, approval for its adoption and subsequent performance will 
necessitate two further rounds of censorship. In order to be shown on television it will 
be checked yet again by the broadcasting censorship department. The list of 33 
prohibitions that guide broadcasters reflect the vaguely-worded taboos identified in 
the Penal Code and Press Law. To mention just a few, they forbid "causing offence"   9
to the president, parliament, army, courts or other public authority; "harming national 
unity or social peace". "endangering public security", "spreading false news", 
"harming the public interest", or expressing abhorrence or disdain for the ruling 
regime if this "arouses the same sentiments in others".  
 
One of the most significant changes on the Egyptian media scene over the past ten 
years has been the introduction of pre-trial detention for journalists under 
investigation for breaking censorship laws in the practice of their profession, together 
with a stiffening of the fines and prison sentences imposed for media "crimes". The 
draconian press law introduced in 1995 caused such an outcry that it was modified 
(though only very slightly) before being re-issued the following year.
18 The increased 
severity of press legislation in Egypt in the mid-1990s was mirrored by new laws 
introduced in other Arab states. Jordan's 1993 press law was tightened by royal decree 
ahead of parliamentary elections in 1997, forcing the closure of 13 weekly 
newspapers.
19 When Jordan's High Court of Justice ruled a few months after the 
election that the amendments were unconstitutional, the amendments were pushed 
through parliament as a law. Further changes in 1999 appeared to soften the press law 
somewhat, but were more than cancelled out by tight "temporary" amendments to the 
Penal Code announced in October 2001. 
 
Amendments to the Tunisian Press Code in 1993 shortened the validity of mandatory 
publishing permits. Permits that were previously issued for an unspecified period had 
thereafter to be submitted for renewal every year.
20 In January 1997, the Press Code 
requirement that copies of publications should be deposited with the ministries of 
interior, justice and information before distribution was extended to acadenuc papers 
prepared for presentation at conferences in Tunisia, regardless of the venue.
21 In 
Morocco, the 1999 accession of King Mohammed VI raised expectations that press 
regulation would be relaxed. In the event, the government continued to enforce the 
siezure, suspension and confiscation powers granted to the Ministry of Interior. The 
year 2000 saw the Moroccan authorities withdrawing the accreditation of several local 
and foreign journalists and permanently closing three weekly newspapers under Press 
Code provisions that allow the banning of material deemed to "undermine the 
foundations of the state".
22 It took a royal amnesty to free two journalists jailed in 
2001 for defaming a minister. 
 
In Lebanon, the only Arab state to allow private broadcasting, implementation of the 
1994 Audiovisual Law with effect from 1996 involved the closure of large numbers of 
radio and television stations. Access to the airwaves was thereby restricted to stations 
backed by political leaders.
23 Syrian controls on Lebanese media, which were much in 
evidence in the early years of Lebanon's civil war, surfaced again in the 1990s. They 
were particularly evident in management changes at LBC in 1998
24 and when two 
journalists were charged by a military tribunal in August 2001.  
 
                                                           
18 Details are given in ARTICLE 19, The Egyptian Predicament, London: 1997, pp 37-40 
19 ARTICLE 19, Blaming the Press: Jordan's Democratization Process in Crisis, London: 1997 
20 ARTICLE 19, Surveillance and Repression: Freedom of Expression in Tunisia, London, 1998, p 39 
21 Ibid. p 41 
22 Reporters sans Frontières, Annual Report 2001 
23 Human Rights Watch, 1997, Lebanon - Restrictions on Broadcasting: In Whose Interest? New York, 
Human Rights Watch. 
24 Samir Kassir, 2000, "Red Lines and Media Blues", Index on Censorship, No 5/2000, pp 139-149   10
The Yemeni government established a Press Prosecution Office in Sanaa in 1993, 
with a mandate to to monitor newspapers, editors and reporters and raise lawsuits. 




As for the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries, the biggest and most 
significant change in media law in the 1990s was the abolition by Qatar of its Ministry 
of Information and formal media censorship in 1996. At the beginning of the 1990s 
the press laws in force in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar all 
imposed prison sentences for such vaguely-worded offences as 'criticising the ruler', 
'disseminating false information', 'disturbing public order', or  'harming' national unity, 
public morality or relations with friendly states". The main difference from one 
country to the next was in whether the length of the prison sentence imposed for such 
offences was measured in months or years.
26 All had information ministries running 
the broadcast media and enforcing press censorship through licensing of publications, 
obligatory deposit of newspapers before (or, in the UAE, at the time of) distribution, 
registration of journalists and so on. Although the UAE claimed to be liberalising its 
media regulation in 1998, cautious steps towards partial relaxation in Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia took until 2000-2001. Qatar consequently remaimed exceptional not 
only in the GCC but in the whole Arab region in taking concrete steps in 1996-97 to 




With only one Arab state adopting such an approach over the ten-year period, it is 
easy to understand the rise of expatriate pan-Arab press and broadcasting during this 
time. While media restrictions at home provided the "push" for the emigé media, new 
openings created by deregulation in European capitals and the greater accessibility of 
satellite technology provided the "pull". Inevitably, the option of publishing or 
broadcasting from abroad was available only to those with sufficient funds. Thus the 
Saudi media, among the most tightly constrained in the home environment, took 
advantage of overseas operations to debate policy issues. However, since all the 
emigré media were owned by members of the ruling family or their relatives or 
allies,
28 the escape to a more liberal environment was not accompanied by outspoken 
criticism of the royal family or the constitutional status quo. Egyptian and Lebanese 
satellite channels, being produced by entities based in their countries of origin, were 
constrained by the imperatives of national legislation and politics.
29 Only Al-Jazeera 
Satellite Channel — staffed by journalists from all over the Arab world, and operating 
in Qatar, the only Arab country to have officially abolished media censorship — 
broke the Arab media mould. 
 
                                                           
25 Sheila Carapico, 1998, Civil Society in Yemen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 53-54 
26 The press laws of all six GCC states at the start of the 1990s are reproduced in A. Derradji, 1995, Le 
droit de la press et la liberté d'information et d'opinion dans les pays arabes [Press law and freedom of 
information and opinion in Arab countries] Paris: Publisud, pp 168-192, 206-217, 317-340. 
27 Al-Hayat interview with Qatar's outgoing Minister of Information and Culture, Hamad Abdel-Aziz 
al-Kuwari, 11
 February, 1996. 
28 Naomi Sakr, 1999, "Frontiers of Freedom: Diverse Responses to Satellite Television in the Middle 
East and North Africa", Javnost/The Public,, Vol. 6, No.1, pp 97-101 
29 Ibid. See also Naomi Sakr, 2001, "Contested Blueprints for Egypt's Satellite Channels: Regrouping 
the Options by Redefining the Debate", Gazette, Vol. 63, Nos 2-3, and Naomi Sakr, 1998, “Daring to 
Talk" The World Today, Vol. 54, No 12   11
2.3 Growth of civil society 
 
It is apparent from an account of trends in politics and the media over the past ten 
years that checks and balances are still conspicuous by their absence in the 
governance of Arab states. Powerful executive branches have contrived to avoid being 
held to account. They have done so by neutralising legislatures, sidestepping 
judiciaries,
30 censoring the media and, as will be shown, placing extremely tight 
restrictions on non-governmental organisations. In several countries these restrictions 
have been introduced in reaction to the emergence of civil society groups. Where civil 
society pressure for accountability is denied legal outlets, such pressure builds up 
outside the law, or at least on the margins of what is officially legal. A review of the 
rise of civil society advocacy groups in a few key Arab states over the past ten years 
can illustrate this point.  
 
The emergence of Arab non-governmental organisations was not a phenomenon 
peculiar to the 1990s. Interest in asserting the right to freedom of association spread 
during the 1980s, driven internally by disillusionment with political ideologies on the 
part of political activists whose organisations were in crisis and "demonstration 
effects" from abroad.
31 The Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) was 
formed in 1985 but was denied formal authorisation on the grounds that its aims were 
political, in violation of the law governing voluntary associations (Law No 32 of 
1964). In contrast, business associations formed to promote privatisation were 
allowed under the same law. This anomaly continued into the 1990s, when more 
human rights advocacy groups in Egypt were obliged by the nature of their objectives 
to remain technically illegal.
32 In December 1998 the Secretary-General of the EOHR 
was imprisoned and in February 2000 he was formally charged with breaching 
controls on fund-raising imposed by a Military Order of 1992. Meanwhile, Civil 
Society, the flagship journal of civil society activists in Egypt and other Arab states, 
published by the Cairo-based Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies in both 
English and Arabic, was pronounced illegal along with other civil society organs by 
the Governor of Cairo in September 1999.  
 
Various factors contributed to a proliferation of Arab NGOs after 1994. Some were 
regional in nature, such as the holding of the International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo in 1994, followed by the Social Summit in Copenhagen in 
1995, both of which spurred independent local research into social issues and 
encouraged civil society activists to respond to the findings of this research. The 
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, provided a further 
stimulant to the formation of groups focusing on women's rights in the Arab world.  
 
                                                           
30 Through measures such as use of military and special courts presided over by judges appointed on 
short-term renewable contracts by government ministers. The judicial process is also sidestepped 
through the raising of lawsuits that are made to hang like the sword of Damocles over government 
critics without actually being brought to court. 
31 See for example, Mohamed El Sayed Said, 1994, "The Roots of Turmoil in the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights: Dynamics of Civil Institution-Building in Egypt", Cairo Papers in 
Social Science, Vol 17, no 3, p 68. See also Moheb Zaki, 1995, Civil Society and Democratization in 
Egypt 1981-1994, Cairo: Dar Al Kutub 
32 One of these, the Group for Democratic Development announced in February 2000 that it was 
freezing its activities because the political and legal climate made its work impossible.    12
Another factor was the European Union's new Mediterranean policy, launched as the 
Euro-Med Partnership in November 1995. The MEDA Democracy Programme 
created within the Partnership was a source of funds to non-profit groups promoting 
democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association 
and protection of vulnerable groups, notably women and young people, in seven Arab 
Mediterranean states plus the Palestinian Authority and Turkey. The large number of 
groups working in the areas under the Palestinian Authority was reflected in their 
remarkably large share of MEDA Democracy grants. A relatively large share also 
went to Morocco. In contrast, low portions for Tunisia and Syria reflected a dearth of 
suitable recipients.
33 Nevertheless, the availability of grants is believed to have 
created an incentive for the formation of new groups.  
 
At the level of individual countries, a resurgence of private associations followed 
Lebanon's emergence from civil war during the early 1990s. Lebanon's confessional 
society, based on the political power-sharing among religious communities, is such 
that many of these associations have a primarily religious affiliation. Indeed Lebanon 
has historically been unusual in the region because of the way sects have marginalised 
national state initutitions. Ultimately, however, despite a degree of liberalism at the 
local level, Lebanese civil society is policed by Syrian security forces. In theory 
private groups are required by law only to inform the government of their 
establishment. In practice the Ministry of Interior insists that associations require a 
ministry permit.
34 Of the broad range of advocacy groups active in Lebanon, those 
advocating human rights and democracy have encountered adverse government 
reaction. They nevertheless contributed to the successful campaign for municipal 
elections, which finally took place in 1998 for the first time since 1963.
35  
 
The lifting of martial law in Jordan in 1989 opened the way to a new era for Jordanian 
civil society. The kingdom's 1990 National Charter stated that individual citizens and 
social and political groups should be able to state their opinions through the national 
media. Its 1992 High Court of Justice Law strengthened the power of the judiciary to 
uphold public challenges to the executive. Major curbs remained, however. The 1992 
law on political parties retained an earlier prohibition on civil society by forbidding 
associations, charities and clubs from using their premises or resources for the benefit 
of any politically partisan organisation. In 1997, the Jordanian authorities issued 
reminders that they should be given two days' prior notice of public meetings.
36 A 
1998 ruling made foreign support for local research centres subject to government 
approval.  
 
While fresh restrictions were being introduced in Jordan, Palestinian and Egyptian 
NGOs were also facing legal restraints on funding, registration and autonomy. Civil 
society activists from several Arab states, anxious to safeguard their organisations' 
very survival, met in Amman in May 1999. There they issued a Declaration of 
Principles and Criteria Relating to the Freedom of Association in Arab Countries, 
based on Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It must be seen as 
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highly indicative of Arab civil society's vulnerability to state interference that, after a 
decade of growth, its organisations were still having to devote so much attention to 
securing their own future, rather than attending to their original objectives. Accounts 
of the struggle for freedom of association and assembly dominated the Workshop on 
Civil Society held as part of the World Bank's Mediterranean Development Forum in 
Cairo in March 2000.  
 
As for civil society use of the Internet at this stage, Internet dissemination of the 
Declaration on the Freedom of Association demonstrated both the potential and actual 
use.
37 It is a feature of the Internet, as of any communication technology, that it 
cannot galvanise networks that do not exist. Civil society networks need to be 
sustained by people able to focus on tasks other than staying on the right side of the 
law before they can be sustained by the Internet. Certainly the demonstration effects 
of the Internet have not been lost on Arab civil society. The high profile use of faxes 
and e-mails by Saudi dissidents in London in the mid-1990s caught the imagination of 
other Arab opposition groups in exile. (Examples of Internet use by these groups are 
discussed in Section 3.2.) Yet Internet links with activists inside Arab countries were 
held back by delays in access and availability in the countries concerned.
38  Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, did not allow public Internet access until 1999, and then only 
through a tightly censored system. Access in Syria came even later, and then only for 
certain members of the elite.  
 
The period between 1999 and 2000 saw rapid increases in Internet subscriptions in the 
majority of Arab countries. Based on estimates that as many as four or five people use 
each Internet account in the Arab world, market research suggested that the overall 
number of Internet users more than doubled in the UAE, increased by more than two 
and a half times in Morocco and rose by 60% in Egypt, 50% in Jordan and nearly 
40% in Oman — all in a single year.
39 Reductions in the cost of connections and a big 
increase in Arabic-language websites help to explain the big increases. But they were 
from such a low base that average Internet penetration across the Arab region was still 
estimated at only 1-2% of the population in 2001.
40 New information and 
communication technologies are seen as potentially beneficial to women's groups all 
over the world, and Arab women's NGOs are no exception to the rule.
41 Indeed, all 
kinds of NGOs in Arab states are now able in theory to network with their 
counterparts and associates overseas. Where this has happened it appears to have 
raised international awareness of the vulnerability of civil society in the Arab world. 
This may in turn have strengthened pressure by western civil society groups on 
western governments and multinational companies to reconsider their policies towards 
Arab governments. Inside the Arab world, however, the problems confronting NGOs 
do not lend themselves to resolution through the mere fact of Internet use.  
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3. Case studies and comparisons 
 
3.1 Activism for women's political participation 
 
Women's participation in politics remains limited across the Arab world, for a 
combination of social and legal reasons. Their limited voice prevents them from 
collectively challenging existing disadvantages, not to mention the impoverishment to 
which women are especially vulnerable through the lay-offs and casualisation of 
labour that accompany privatisation. Women's right to pass their nationality to their 
children is another burning legal and political issue in the Arab world, because of the 
material disadvantages caused when this right is denied. In the four case studies 
discussed here, civil society groups confronted law-makers and opinion-formers in an 
attempt to secure women's presence in the national legislature. Their varying degrees 
of success suggest that it was not their methods or strategies that were to blame in the 
case of failure, but the relative strength of all civil society and human rights advocacy 
groups in the four environments. Even though the campaign for women's political 
participation is not a party-political one, it has made more headway in countries with a 
functioning multi-party system than in those without.  
 
3.1.1 The Palestinian campaign 
Women have long played a central role in the Palestinian national liberation 
movement. For decades also, Palestinians' common interest in national liberation 
tended to cut across other social identities such as those based on birthplace, family, 
religion or social class. When substantial Arab aid was pledged to the Palestinians in 
1979, in reaction against Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, grass roots movements 
sprang up as receptacles for the aid, mobilising thousands of participants in trade 
unions, student bodies, charitable societies and women's organisations. United in 
opposing Israel's grip on the Occupied Territories and unrestrained at that time by a 
central Palestinian quasi-state authority, these groups found their voice in the first 
intifada, or uprising, that started in 1987. Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
experience of the first intifada supports the argument that "new kinds of organisation" 
may be the decisive variable in producing "sustained collective action where before 
there [was] only widespread discontent".
42 Moreover, alternative modes of activism 
were developed during the intifada in response to Israeli curfews, sieges and electrical 
blackouts. One side-effect was a breaking down of restrictive boundaries between the 
public and private spheres, with particular implications for perceptions of women's 
status. 
 
In the aftermath of the first intifada, however, women's groups found themselves 
marginalised and in a vacuum.
43 Marginalisation become overwhelmingly apparent 
when technical committees were formed to negotiate under the framework of the 
multilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks that started in late 1991. In these committees the 
ratio of men to women was 410 to five.
44 Fearing a reversion to patriarchal traditons 
and mindful of the discriminatory Family Code forced on Algerian women in 1984, 
two decades after Algeria achieved independence, Palestinian women affiliated with 
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three political parties joined forces with representatives of specialised women's 
centres. They called for the formation of a dedicated women's technical committee 
that would address women's political, social and civil rights and work for better 
representation of women within the other technical committees.
45 The result was the 
Women's Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), formed in August 1992 by 16 
volunteers, who all had other jobs as well as political and family obligations.  
 
In 1994, after the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles was worked out in Oslo 
and the fledgling Palestinian Authority was formed, the other technical committees 
were merged into ministries. WATC developed instead into a coalition of NGOs and 
committees and obtained enough funding for a full-time director and secretary. It 
drafted a Women's Bill of Rights based on international conventions and human rights 
law and set about training women in communication, administration, gender 
sensitivity and human rights. WATC took a proactive approach to the media. At that 
time the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation was starting up and journalists 
representing the international media were present in large numbers in and around 
Jerusalem. In the run-up to elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 
1996, WATC called for women to have a quota of 30 per cent of the council's 88 
seats. The Committee produced a bi-weekly newsletter entitled "Women and 
Elections" and trained large numbers of women to argue their case. 
 
Significantly, it was WATC's achievement not on quotas but on another issue that 
raised the Committee's profile and increased its support. But it is equally significant 
that the publicity gained through action on the other issue had the effect of drawing 
attention to, and underlining the legitimacy of, the ongoing campaign for political 
representation. The other issue arose from a decision by  the Palestinian Ministry of 
Interior in November 1995 to draw on Jordanian law and impose a major constraint 
on women's freedom of movement, by requiring any woman applying for a passport 
to obtain the written consent of a male guardian. WATC fought the ruling by 
organising street demonstrations, circulating petitions, providing speakers for live 
radio debates and briefng local and foreign journalists. The demonstrations, which 
coincided with the 1996 elections, were consequently two-pronged: they attacked the 
passport regulation and called for women's representation on the legislative council at 
the same time. Of the two, the campaign against the passport ruling was the more 
successful. The ruling was officially rescinded in March 1996 and a subsequent 
attempt by the Ministry of Transport to insist on chaperones for women taking driving 
lessons was also withdrawn under pressure from the WATC.  
 
Other WATC successes followed, on matters such as maternity leave and women's 
access to bank accounts and passports for their children. Crucially, successes on this 
front encouraged more groups to attach themselves to the Committee. The campaign 
for quotas on the legislative council did not succeed in getting quotas accepted. In the 
event, 28 women and more than 400 men ran for the 88-seat legislative council and 
only five women won seats. However, WATC put the experience to use in getting 
women representatives on municipal councils. These were originally to have been 
elected but were ultimately appointed by by Ministry of Local Government. WATC 
reacted by organising its own elections in villages to enable village women to choose 
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their own representatives. The Committee then demanded that the women chosen be 
included on municipal councils, with the result that 30 women were appointed.
46 
Meanwhile it kept the issue to the forefront of national debate through regular media 
slots, including a 20-minute radio programme, With Women, aired three mornings per 
week; a bi-weekly newspaper supplement called Saut al-Nissa ("The Voice of 
Women"), distributed with Al-Ayyam, and a weekly 55-minute television programme 
called Bisaraha ("Frankly"), screened on Fridays at 6 o'clock.
47  
 
WATC representatives say they achieved what they did
48 because they used their 
coalition as a tool, not an objective in its own right. Their support from women's 
committees of different political parties precluded ideological agreement. The 
unifying issue was simply equal rights for women. As such, members of the coalition 
focused on equality and, as WATC director Suheir Azzoumi puts it, "learned not to 
hold debates with women haters or with those using women's issues and concerns for 
political purposes".
49 They were operating in exceptionally fluid circumstances, where 
they could challenge legislation almost while it was still being drafted and where they 
could appeal to the international community on whose funding Palestinian law-
makers relied. Lively elections in 1996 gave them an opportunity to get politicians to 
make commitments on women's political representation, while the diversity of 
Palestinian media meant they had outlets for expression that are not available to 
campaigners in many other Arab countries.  
 
3.1.2 The Moroccan campaign 
Before his death in July 1999, King Hassan II of Moroccan made some moves 
towards a very limited form of democratisation, known as gouvernement d'alternance, 
whereby the executive branch of government would alternate between centre-right 
and centre-left administrations.  Opposition parties were initially offered minor 
positions in government but turned these down. It was only in March 1998, after five 
years of hard negotiation, constitutional changes and new elections, that, for the first 
time, a prime minister from the koutla (socialist opposition bloc) was asked to form a 
cabinet. Thus by the time Hassan's son acceded to the throne as King Mohammed VI, 
the elderly Abderrahman Youssoufi of the Union socialiste des forces populaires 
(USFP) was heading a coalition government composed of representatives of seven 
parties, although the three key ministries of interior, finance and foreign policy were 
still subject to royal approval. King Mohammed helped to push the liberalisation 
process forward by sacking his father's feared interior minister and calling on 
Moroccans to think of themselves as citizens rather than subjects.
50 Shortly before his 
accession the human rights organisation Amnesty International was permitted to open 
an office in Rabat. 
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Against this background of gradual political liberalisation, the Association 
Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), formed in 1985, launched a campaign 
to increase the number of women in parliament and on local councils. This was a 
major challenge, given that Morocco at that stage had yet to sign the Convention for 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), women 
were legally disadvantaged by the kingdom's Personal Status Law and female literacy 
was barely 40 per cent,
51 with only four out of ten girls attending school.
52 In 1992, 
the year the king devolved some power to the prime minister by allowing him to 
choose some cabinet members, the ADFM created the Committee for Women's 
Participation in Political Life. Bringing together women and men of different political 
persuasions, the committee took a neutral stance vis-à-vis political parties and 
concentrated on the sole issue of women's participation in politics.
53 It encouraged 
women to present themselves as parliamentary candidates attached to the party of 
their choice. In the 1993 elections to the directly-elected 325-seat lower chamber, the 
first legislative elections for nine years, 36 women stood for election and two were 
elected to parliament for the first time.
54 The same year, the Moroccan government 
was persuaded to sign CEDAW, albeit with reservations on five articles.
55  
 
Pleased though they were with the election breakthrough, the ADFM recognised a 
need to build on it by working on all fronts. They perceived a vicious circle whereby 
the fact that politics ignored women was causing women to ignore politics.
56 They 
showed that women were socialised into deliberately avoiding a leadership role. They 
found that men regarded the struggle for women's political participation as one to be 
undertaken by women alone. Even men who considered themselves supportive would 
say "go for it, we are behind you", as if "behind" was the right place to be.
57 After  a 
great deal of training and networking among a burgeoning number of Moroccan 
women's NGOs, as well as human rights NGOs, political parties and government 
representatives, the number of women standing for election in both the parliamentary 
and municipal elections increased. In 1997, there were 1651 women candidates for 
municipal elections, of whom 83 were elected, and 87 candidates for parliamentary 
elections, as a result of which two women gained seats in each of the upper and lower 
houses of parliament.  
 
That the members of ADFM found this outcome disappointing was apparent from 
their communiqués. They regretted the fact that no national measure had been adopted 
to stimulate female participation in the elections. Political parties that had undertaken 
to operate a quota system for women reportedly failed to honour their commitment, 
without offering any public justification for doing so. ADFM drew comparisons 
between the 0.6 per cent of  parliamentary seats occupied by women in Morocco with 
the global average of 11 per cent and the 30 per cent target for 2000 established as 
part of the Beijing Platform for Action drawn up by the Fourth World Conference on 
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Women in Beijing. As for the multiple reasons contributing to Morocco's low 
percentage of women MPs, these were implictly recognised in the Moroccan 
government's 1999 Action Plan to Integrate Women in Development. This plan 
involved 215 steps to be taken in four areas: education and literacy; health; the fight 
against poverty' and legal protection of women's rights through reform of the 
Moudawana (family code).  
 
After the 1997 elections, ADFM announced that it intended henceforward to pursue 
the aim of placing women's citizenship at the heart of Morocco's modernisation 
challenge through a combination of action and research.
58 With a view to preparing 
for the 2002 elections, it founded the Centre de Leadership F'eminin (CLEF), which 
has trained women in advocacy and communication skills, facilitated coordination 
with and among local community groups and worked towards raising the visibility of 
women occupying positions in politics, while also raising public awareness through 
the media.
59 At the same time, through research into the Moroccan media and school 
textbooks, members of the association revealed how the thrust of the government's 
Action Plan to Integrate Women in Development was being contradicted and 
counteracted on a daily basis by words and images received in almost every home. 
Analysis of advertisements, serialised television dramas and other texts showed that 
influential forms of public communication were perpetuating the subordination of 
women in all spheres. Official policies in favour of women's advancement were not 
reflected even in those newspapers and broadcast media under government ownership 
and control.
60 The research report that highlighted these contradictions made several 
recommendations, including the adoption of an advertising code of ethics to outlaw 
negative stereotypes, gender-sensitivity training for journalists, the creation of an 
award for original feature-writing on women's contribution to development and a 
proactive policy of regularly inviting women commentators onto television 
programmes to discuss heavyweight subjects that affect both men and women. 
 
At the broader socio-legal level, government initiatives have fallen short of ADFM 
broad aspirations. After more than a year of debate over reform of the Moudawana, 
the government decided in March 2001 to send the text to a royal commission for 
arbitration, to mollify conservative criticism of the reforms. There has even been a 
feeling of backtracking on progress towards human rights generally, with a renewed 
crackdown on press freedom and demonstrations by human rights groups. At the 
purely party-political level, however, the ADFM can claim some success. At its spring 
2001 congress, the first for ten years, the prime minister's party, the USFP, promised 
to allocate 20 per cent of official party posts to women.
61  
 
3.1.3 The Kuwaiti campaign 
Kuwait has had a parliament, the National Assembly, since 1963. The assembly is 
subject to dissolution by the Emir, and has been dissolved by him in 1976, 1986 and 
1999. The 1986 suspension was indefinite and the assembly was reconvened in 1992 
at the urging of Western members of the military coalition that ended Iraq's 
occupation of Kuwait the previous year. The assembly is highly vocal and has the 
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power to veto legislation and call government ministers for questioning. As political 
parties are banned in Kuwait, political groupings are somewhat fluid and alliances 
form on the basis of specific issues. Following cultivation of conservative tribal 
groups by sections of the ruling family during the 1980s and 1990s, as a 
counterweight to more cosmopolitan and democratically-minded merchant families, 
the National Assembly elected in 1999 was evenly split — and polarised  — between 
deputies identified as having liberal credentials and those without. Given the way this 
polarisation caused the stalling of urgent legislation and an atmosphere of policy 
paralysis, a seasoned Kuwaiti commentator spoke for many when he argued in 2001 
that one way out of the impasse would be to modernise the electoral system by: 
reorganising electoral districts (on non-tribal lines); reducing the minimum age for 
voting from 21 to 18; and allowing women to vote and run for political office.
62  
 
Women have been campaigning for suffrage in Kuwait since at least the start of the 
1970s. In the early days the issue of enfranchisement became entangled with that of 
polygamy and was set aside. In the 1980s, government nervousness about the growing 
strength of women's support for Islamist associations reduced ministers' enthusiasm 
for allowing women to vote.
63 In the 1996 election, women's voluntary organisations, 
which have to be licensed by the government, were again vocal in demanding the 
vote. There is nothing in the Kuwaiti consitution to bar women from voting or 
standing for election. The bar lies in the election law, passed in 1962, that allowed 
only literate Kuwaiti males over the age of 30 to stand as candidates and Kuwaiti men 
over the age of 21 to vote. When Kuwait signed CEDAW in 1994, it placed a 
reservation on Article 7, the CEDAW article that forbids discrimination against 
women in the field of political participation.
64 In fact, since the National Assembly 
was reinstated in 1992, women's enfranchisement has been repeatedly blocked by 
parliament and the courts. This is despite the fact that women`s suffrage officially has 
the support of Kuwait`s head of state, the Emir, while women are represented in many 
sectors of public life, including high-level posts in the media, government ministries 
and diplomatic service. Representation at senior levels of decision-making is under 3 
per cent of the total, according to the Women's Issues Committee, a coalition of 20 
Kuwaiti NGOs. Nevertheless, women voters and politicians are increasingly being 
seen as essential to safeguard the gains made by women in other fields by fending off 
legislation designed to circumscribe their presence in public life. 
 
For example, at a time when the government is under pressure to restructure the 
heavily over-staffed public sector and reduce its salary bill, pressure is mounting on 
women employees to retire when they are still only 35 to 40 years old.
65 A law 
allowing working mothers to retire after 15 years of service, regardless of their age, 
was one of several laws passed during the first post-occupation parliament that were 
aimed at curbing women`s activities outside the home. Another, passed in 1996 and 
with a five-year grace period for application, called for gender segregation in all post-
secondary educational institutions.
66 Particularly high percentages of women students 
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in university have induced the government to consider imposing quotas in faculties 
such as medicine and engineering to redress the balance in favour of men. Meanwhile, 
social allowances are automatically added to men`s salaries as they are assumed to be 




In the aftermath of Kuwait`s liberation from Iraqi occupation, women's contribution to 
the resistance and war effort was acknowledged by the Emir, who went on to promise 
women political rights. In the years that followed, however, initiatives by civil society 
groups on behalf of women`s suffrage were thwarted by the same conservative tribal 
factions the ruling family had cultivated to shore up its powerbase in the face of 
pressure form urban merchant families for a devolution of power. Crucially, the 
practice of scapegoating women for Kuwait's mounting economic and social ills also 
sapped liberal support for the advancement of women's political rights. National 
debates among liberals about citizenship focused primarily on the voting rights of 
naturalised Kuwaitis and the Kuwaiti bedoon (see Section 1.2), but not on women. 
The mainstay of women's suffrage among the political groups represented in 
parliament was the National Democratic Movement, formed after the 1996 elections 
as an alternative to the Kuwait Democratic Forum.
68 The new grouping included six 
women among its 72 founders and elected two as members of its executive board.
69 
Women's political rights were established as central to the group's platform, to which 
many of the liberal MPs elected to the National Assembly in July 1999 appeared 
sympathetic. 
 
In the face of deepening polarisation between liberals and conservatives, the Emir 
took matters into his own hands. He dissolved the eighth National Assembly on May 
4
th 1999 after debates about government involvement in publishing incorrect copies of 
the Muslim holy book, the Quran, got out of hand. Less than two weeks later, on May 
16
th, he issued a decree extending full political rights to women, allowing them to 
register as voters during the next round of registration on the electoral rolls in 
February 2000 and to vote in the elections due to be held in 2003.
70 However, the 
National Assembly did not take kindly to this emiri decree. The Constitution allows 
the government to enact laws in parliament's absence in urgent cases, but laws enacted 
in this way remain subject to ratification by the Assembly. Voting in mid-November, 
MPs asserted their authority vis-à-vis the Emir by rejecting his decree by 41 votes to 
22. Those voting in favour included government ministers. When an equivalent bill 
was introduced from within parliament two weeks later, it was also defeated, but this 
time by a majority of only 32 votes to 30, with two abstentions. Supporters of the 
second defeat claimed that passing the legislation would be capitulation to US 
pressure on Kuwait, exerted behind the scenes. 
 
The campaign continued, however, led by women and men. When the electoral lists 
opened in February 2000 for the month-long registration period, large queues formed 
of people attempting to register women's names. Several hundred women converging 
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on 13 precincts found that they were permitted to register at ten of these, but were 
turned down at the other three.
71 The next move was for five women to file cases 
against the Minister of Interior and Speaker of Parliament, based on women's rights 
under the Constitution.
72 These cases reached the Constitutional Court, only to be 
thrown out on the procedural grounds that a challenge to interpretation of the 
Constitution must come from a lower court or from the executive or legislature, but 
not from a private citizen. The Constitutional Court rejected subsequent lawsuits 
pursued through the Election Challenges Court and the Administrative Court, in one 
case without giving an explanation and in the other on the grounds that the plaintiffs 
had not properly authorised their lawyer to represent them.
73 
 
With time running out before the election scheduled for 2003, women activists can 
only pursue their campaign through a partially-sympathetic media and through civil 
society, which in Kuwait's case includes the male-dominated diwaniyas (meeting 
rooms in private houses). The media's importance to the campaign was symbolised in 
March 2001 when Hidaya Sultan al-Salem, the female editor-in-chief and owner of 
the weekly newspaper Al-Majaless, was assassinated in a busy street in broad 
daylight. The judiciary's central role in thwarting the campaign has been highlighted 
by its rejection of challenges to the electoral law.  
 
3.1.4 The Egyptian campaign 
Women have had the vote and the right to stand for political office in Egypt since 
1956. Between 1960 and 1976 the number of women holding seats in the Maglis al-
Shaab (People's Assembly) varied between two and eight. After constitutional 
reforms in 1979 earmarked 30 seats for women in the People's Assembly, more than 
200 women stood for these earmarked seats in the election of 1984. The 30 winners 
joined three women who defeated male candidates and two others appointed by the 
President of the Republic,
74 making a total of 35 women in a parliament of 454 seats. 
This proportion declined sharply thereafter. The Supreme Constitutional Court ruled 
in 1987 that special women's seats violated the constitutional principle of equality. 
The 1990 elections returned only seven women, alongside three appointed by the 
president. In the 1995 elections, 83 women ran, of whom only 15 were put forward by 
the contesting political parties and the remainder were independents.. The number 
elected, however, was even lower than in 1990, at just five, with four appointed.
 75 
Again, in the 2000 elections, only seven women won seats.
76 This decline took place 
against a backdrop of increasing domination by the ruling National Democratic Party 
(NDP) of election campaigns and seats in the National Assembly.
77  
 
In view of the plunge in women's representation, calls increased during the 1990s for 
a revival of the quota system, at least as a temporary measure, to boost women's 
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presence in the legislature. But attention also turned to the question of voter turnout 
and the registration of women voters. The International Conference on Population and 
Development, held in Cairo in 1994, helped to energise Egyptian NGOs working on 
women's issues. An NGO survey conducted ahead of the conference reported that 
92.6 per cent of Egyptian women were not registered on voting lists. It also stated that 
only 27.9 per cent of those registered actually used their vote.
78 This was despite 
support given to the registration of women voters by the official National Council for 
Motherhood and Childhood, chaired by Suzanne Mubarak, wife of the Egyptian 
president. Governmental support for the social and political advancement of women 
was reinforced in early 2000 with the creation of the National Commission for 
Women. 
 
Two Egyptian NGOs set out in the mid-1990s to rectify the non-registration of 
women voters. They realised the practical difficulties underlying the low turnout of 
women, including the fact that a woman applying for a polling card needs to present 
her identity card or birth certificate, which very few women in poor or rural areas 
actually have in their possession. Such time-consuming and bureaucratic hurdles are 
often compounded by male family members' lack of support. The Egyptian Centre for 
Women's Rights decided that its activities should include helping women to obtain 
their birth certificates and identity cards. Without getting dragged into debates about 
the meaning of equality, it produced explanatory picture booklets aimed at women 
with low literacy levels and attempted (with little success) to get its work publicised 
in the (largely government-owned) press.
79 Founded with just seven people, the 
Centre expanded to encompass 53 workers and forge links with 89 local associations, 




A second NGO, focusing specifically on the registration of women voters, grew out of 
two conferences organised by the Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies in 
1994 and 1995. One was on Egyptian Women in Public Life and the other on Arab 
Women in Public Life. Formed in 1996, the League of Egyptian Women Voters, 
named HODA for short after the 1920s Egyptian feminist Hoda Shaarawi, enlisted 
volunteers to visit towns and villages. There they would explain voting principles and 
procedures to women and help them register to vote. Amina Shafiq, a respected 
journalist at Al-Ahram, led HODA as the head of its Board of Trustees. Like the Ibn 
Khaldun Centre, HODA obtained funding from the European Union under the EU's 
MEDA Democracy Programme. They and the Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights 




Foreign funding for NGO work is a sensitive issue in Egypt, especially when the 
NGO recipients of foreign funding are not looked upon favourably by the 
government. While the Ibn Khaldun Centre registered as a private company and 
claimed not to be covered by laws governing NGOs, human rights advocacy groups 
were generally denied the right to register under the Law of Associations, Law No 32 
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of 1964 (see Section 2.2). The three MEDA Democracy grants mentioned above 
coincided with a particularly dire period for Egyptian NGOs. The year 1999 saw 
enactment of Law 153 as a successor to Law 32, enforcing even stricter government 
controls over NGO policy, activities, personnel and funding. In June 2000, Egypt's 
Supreme Constitutional Court threw out Law 153 of 1999 on the grounds that it had 
not been seen by the appointed upper house, the State Council, before being passed by 
the People's Assembly. The authorities showed, however, that neither Law 32 nor 
Law 153 were really needed to restrict the funding of NGOs or private companies. 
They ordered the arrest of Saadeddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldun Centre, and 
his associates on suspicion of charges that were eventually identified as including 
contravention of Military Order No 4 of 1992, which prohibits the raising of funds 
from any source without authorisation. At dawn on July 1, 2000, the 61-year-old Dr 
Ibrahim, who has dual Egyptian-American nationality, was arrested, his files and 
computer confiscated and the Ibn Khaldun centre closed and put under police guard. 
Among those detained with Dr Ibrahim were three staff of HODA, whose files were 
also confiscated and whose offices were closed on July 12.
82 All together, a total of 28 
people connected with both institutions were eventually charged. 
 
When the detainees were released on bail in August, after spending six weeks in 
prison, it was initially thought the projects for which they had obtained EU funding 
would go ahead. One of the Ibn Khaldun projects to be financed by the EU money 
was to have been a short video showing a discussion between a rural married couple, 
who start by discussing some of the problems faced by ordinary Egyptians and go on 
to decide that the best way to work towards solving these problems would be to go 
through the voter registration process in order to cast their vote.
83 In the event, this 
project was stopped, as was the Ibn Khaldun Centre's plan to repeat its 1995 exercise 
of monitoring the polls. This was because formal charges were laid against Saadeddin 
Ibrahim and 27 others in September 2000, after which their trial started at the State 
Security Court in January 2001. On 21 May 2001 the trial judge issued a guilty 
verdict, handing down jail sentences of up to seven years to Dr Ibrahim and six others 
and one-year suspended sentences to the rest. Much local media coverage of the trial 
was hostile to the defendants, suggesting that they served an "un-Egyptian agenda".
84 
 
It remains to be seen how campaigns to encourage women to vote will fare in future 
under the cloud of the Ibn Khaldun case. After the initial interrogations it became 
clear that the authorities had no quarrel with HODA. On the contrary, Amina Shafiq 
was appointed to a subcommittee of the National Commission for Women. 
Allegations later emerged that a State Security informant working within HODA had 
used her position in the organisation and its links with the Ibn Khaldun Centre to plant 
evidence to incriminate Dr Ibrahim while on a visit to his house. Yet disparate 
treatment for personnel from the two groups will have done little to mitigate the 
generally chilling effect of the prolonged court case against a prominent civil society 
figure. As an Egyptian women activist noted, soon after Egypt's new government-
sponsored National Commission for Women was formed in early 2000, the real 
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burden of defending women's rights would still fall on NGOs.
85 Given funding 
shortages, legal obstacles and public suspicion fanned by hostile media, NGOs could 
find the burden too heavy. 
 
3.2  Activism against human rights abuse 
 
Of the multiple human rights violations recorded in Arab states, copious documentary 
evidence exists of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, denial of freedom of 
expression and denial of freedom of assembly and association. It is left to advocacy 
groups in civil society to bring these cases to light and campaign to end them. The two 
campaigns considered here brought the issue of accountability for human rights abuse 
to international attention, though with mixed results in terms of ending the abuse. 
State authorities could still deny they were violating human rights and they could still 
censor and suppress allegations made in the print and audiovisual media. They had 
little control, however, over allegations circulating via satellite television and the 
Internet. Nor, as these case studies show, could they remain permanently aloof from 
the international human rights monitoring machinery. 
 
3.2.1.  The Bahraini campaign 
Bahrain's history of repression is well known. From the mid-1970s onwards, when the 
Emir's refusal to allow industrial unrest to be channelled through trade unions or 
strikes led to his 1975 dissolution of the National Assembly, the country was ruled 
directly by the executive, appointed by the Emir, Sheikh Issa bin Salman Al Khalifa, 
and dominated by his Al Khalifa clan. From 1974, under the State Security Law, 
Bahraini security forces were given wide-ranging powers to suppress dissent. 
Opponents were jailed and held incommunicado and without trial for up to three 
years, in conditions conducive to torture. Detainees reported beatings, electric shocks, 
sexual abuse, burning with cigarettes, and prolonged sleep deprivation.
86 Arbitrary 
arrest and detention continued after Sheikh Issa moved in step with other Gulf states 
in the wake of the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and set up a government-appointed 
Consultative Council to "advise" on legislation. When 25,000 Bahrainis signed a 
petition in 1994, calling for reform, up to 15,000 were arrested.
87  
 
By the time the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, succeeded his father on 
the latter's death in March 1999, an active Bahraini opposition movement was gaining 
an increasingly high profile from bases in cities such as London, Copenhagen and 
Damascus. The Internet facilitated communication among different groups in the 
movement, from the Bahrain Freedom Movement, to the Committee for the Defence 
of Human Rights in Bahrain and the Bahrain Human Rights Orgnisation. The 
combination of a new Emir, a deepening economic and political malaise, and a vocal 
opposition both locally and abroad produced a remarkable sequence of promised 
reforms and human rights guarantees in 2000 and early 2001. 
  
Dissidents living in forced exile appealed to the Emir in August 2000 to allow them to 
return and help resolve the nation's political and economic impasse. The Emir 
appeared to respond the following month when he expanded and diversified the 
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membership of the appointed Consultative Council.
88 The larger, more robust Council 
found much to disagree with in government policy, prompting the Emir to set up a 
special 46-member committee with a three-week brief to advise on a draft charter for 
constitutional reform. The timetable implied that this so-called National Action 
Charter was to be signed and sealed in time for Bahrain's National Day on December 
16. But, instead of accepting the draft, some committee members suggested it did not 
go far enough. As a means of arbitrating on the text, a referendum was suggested. 
Once Sheikh Hamad had scheduled a referendum for February 14-15th, in which all 
Bahrainis over the age of 20 would vote, he and his son, Crown Prince Sheikh Salman 
bin Hamad, moved into campaigning mode, circulating among voters and listening to 
their concerns.  
 
The Emir's personal enthusiasm for this consultation process, geared to getting the 
Charter approved, stemmed no doubt from a clause in the document that would 
transform him from an emir to a king and thereby make it easier for him to overrule 
rivals among his relatives. Opposition groups were less enthusiastic about the Charter, 
however, and threatened to boycott the referendum. On February 5, the Emir did what 
was needed to avert a boycott. He declared a general amnesty for political prisoners 
and detainees, announced that Bahraini nationals living in forced exile would be 
allowed to return, and ordered the reinstatement of dissidents sacked from 
government jobs or sent down from the university.
89 Thereupon, Bahrainis voted 
overwhelmingly for the Charter. In doing so they agreed to a constitutional monarchy, 
a government based on separation of executive, legislative and judicial power, 
political participation for men and women and a bicameral legislature with the lower 
chamber due to be elected in 2004. 
 
With the National Charter approved, the Emir had little choice but to abolish the 
notorious 1974 State Security Law and, with it, the State Security Court, whose 
hearings were held behind closed doors with no right of appeal. At the same time, 
Bahraini nationality was promised to around 10,000 stateless inhabitants (bidoon). On 
March 4, six months after refusing permission for an independent Bahraini human 
rights group to be established, the Emir granted permission after all.
90 The large-scale 
release of political prisoners and detainees during the intervening period was well 
timed, given the impending visit of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
which had been postponed from October 1999 to early 2001. 
 
3.2.2  The Syrian campaign 
Syrian groups wanting to act independently of the Syrian government and its 
numerous intelligence services have long had to do so from abroad. The Syrian 
Committees for the Defence of Democratic Freedoms and Human Rights (CDFDH) 
started life inside Syria but had to take refuge in Paris, with adherents resident in 
several different European cities. From there the organisation monitored the penalties 
imposed inside Syria on those accused of offences such as "shaking the confidence of 
the masses" or "opposing the aims of the revolution".
91 Charges of disseminating false 
information were brought against 17 people in December 1991-January 1992, based 
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on a leaflet published by the CDFDH documenting human rights abuses during the 
presidential election of December 1991.  
 
The Committees at that time had existed for barely two years. The organisation was 
formed in Syria in 1989 to bring together people of different political persuasions who 
believed that changes taking place in Eastern Europe and elsewhere could herald a 
move towards political liberalisation in Syria and a rebirth of civil society. Of the 17 
people charged, ten were sent to prison for terms ranging from five to 10 years and 
some were tortured.
92 The task of disseminating news about the fate of these and 
hundreds of other political prisoners was facilitated by the Internet and Internet-based 
information services such as the International Freedom of Expression Exchange 
(IFEX). Inside Syria, however, Internet access is extremely limited. Ordinary Syrians 
seeking unfettered Internet access have to resort to the expensive option of using a 
Lebanese Internet Service Provider. 
 
That thousands of political prisoners were held in Syria during the 1990s has been 
confirmed by the hundreds released in periodic, strategically-timed amnesties since 
1995. Aktham Naesa, a lawyer imprisoned for his part in producing a CDFDH leaflet 
in 1991, was released at the end of May 1998 with 30 other long-term political 
prisoners shortly before a state visit to France by President Hafez al-Asad. A further 
600 were released by President Bashar al-Asad between his takeover on his father's 
death in 1999 and the end of 2000. Although the new president is credited with taking 
initiatives to liberalise both politics and Syria's highly-troubled economy, prisoner 
releases have also been brought about in part through the sustained effort of Syrian 
exiles. The latter have been able, through coordination via the Internet and other 
means, to highlight Syrian government human rights violations at opportune moments 
when western media were paying attention to Syria for other reasons. For example, 
Pope John Paul's visit to Damascus in May 2001 was accompanied by the release of 
Nizar Nayyouf  (another of the 17 detaineees mentioned above) after ten years in jail. 
When Syrian President Bashar al-Asad paid a state visit to Paris in July 2001, 
Nayyouf addressed an open letter to French President Jacques Chirac alleging that 




Seeing an opportunity for action under the new president, many Syrians moved to 
revive civil society in their country after an enforced break of nearly 40 years. All 
private newspapers were shut down in March 1963. Thus when the first private 
newspapers started to re-appear in early 2001, observers watched avidly to see how 
heavily they would be censored. It soon became clear that political coverage would 
remain off-limits despite the potential for political debate to identify policy pathways 
out of Syria's economic crisis. Criticism of economic management was allowed in a 
highly-popular satirical newspaper launched in February 2001. Tackling issues such 
as unemployment, inflation, lack of housing and petty corruption, the paper sold out 
daily within two hours of delivery to newsstands,
94 The relevance of its subject matter 
to ordinary Syrians can be gauged from estimates that unemployment is 20 per cent, 
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while 75 per cent of the poplation earns less than $100 per month.
95 But the paper's 
freedom was not open-ended; it was forced in June to remove pages to avoid total 
banning. Similarly, applications to re-launch two respected political dailies that 
existed before 1963 were turned down.
96 The CDFDH openly published its own 
magazine in May but revealed that the authorities had blocked an attempt to convene 
a human rights training course the previous month.  
 
The course was blocked in the very same month that the UN Committee on Human 
Rights in Geneva was commenting on a report finally submitted by Syria regarding its 
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Syria ratified the ICCPR in 1969 and became legally bound by it when the treaty 
came into force in 1976. After submitting its first mandatory report on compliance in 
1978, it not only failed to abide by the four-yearly reporting requirement but failed to 
submit any periodic report at all until after President Bashar al-Asad's accession. This 
was despite at least 25 requests from the Human Rights Committee, the largest 
number outstanding for any country.
97 One of the HRC's main concerns on receiving 
the long-awaited report was the Syria's continuing reliance its State of Emergency 
legislation.
98 The voicing of this concern added international weight to increasingly 
audible internal calls for the Emergency law to be lifted.  
 
The law's status remained unclear, however, as officials had to admit it had not been 
cancelled.
99 Even without the Emergency Law, Syria's Penal Code gives the 
authorities ample ammunition with which to stifle civil society debate. Article 291 of 
the Penal Code imposes a five-year prison sentence for the crime of aiming to change 
the Constitution of the state "by illegitimate means". Since the Constitution identifies 
the Baath Party as the vanguard party in society and the state, any talk of 
downgrading the party's role is automatically criminalised. Article 327 of the Penal 
Code also states that any association or group that fails to give complete information 
on its members, meetings and resources is to be considered secret and its leaders 
liable to imprisonment. In 1993-94, approximately 300 people were tried in Syria for 
membership of an illegal organisation and several received prison sentences of 15 
years.
100 These provisions and precedents are of particular relevance to the private 
discussion groups that sprang up during 2000, calling themselves civil society forums. 
In early 2001 they created a joint commission, but were told soon afterwards that in 
future they would have to apply for permission to convene, 15 days ahead of any 
meeting. Out of around 70 forums existing before these restrictions were imposed, 
only two received authorisation during the following month, including one organised 
by a member of the ruling Baath Party.  
 
The beginnings of a showdown between the authorities and the groups behind the 
civil society forums emerged in 2001, when Riad al-Turk, a veteran dissident who 
was jailed from 1980 to 1998, was re-arrested after criticising the political system in a 
lecture. He had also described Hafez al-Asad as a dictator during an appearance on 
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Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel.
101 Instead of intimidating other dissidents, the arrest 
provoked a statement from Nizar Nayyouf, which he made from a safe distance, being 
in Paris. (Nayyouf was promised the right to leave the country for medical treatment 
during President Bashar al-Asad's France visit in July.) More civil society activists 
were then detained, including a member of the CDFDH. However, with alliances 
forming among disparate but increasingly dissatisfied civil and political groups and 
with members of these groups able to put their case to a sympathetic pan-Arab 
audience via Al-Jazeera, information about further arrests of government critics could 
be disseminated much more widely than was the case ten years earlier.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The past ten years have seen many groups in Arab states become more disadvantaged, 
politically and economically, than was previously the case. Israeli economic closures 
in the Occupied Territories and their highly negative impact on Palestinian livelihoods 
started with a vengeance in the mid-1990s. International sanctions on Iraq followed 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the invasion, Arab expatriates of 
particular nationalities were forced out of employment in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Disadvantage created by the civil conflict in Algeria dates from 1992. The rise of 
extremist ideologies and armed cells in Algeria and many other Arab states was 
fuelled during the 1990s by events in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. To the 
extent that ruling establishments looked first to their own survival, by playing off 
sections of the political opposition against each other, they contributed to conditions 
in which non-armed extremism could take root. This in turn was most obviously 
disadvantageous to women and secularists. Against this background, educational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the world has become more stark. Schooling for 
Palestinians and Iraqis has been disrupted and starved of essentials, while limits on 
academic freedom have become tighter across the Arab region, from Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt to Tunisia.  
 
When judged on the basis of net change between 1990 and 2000, political change in 
key Arab states appears to have moved away from liberalisation rather than towards 
it. Even in countries such as Yemen, Jordan and Morocco, where politics did open up 
during the decade, the early promise of liberalisation was not fulfilled. As recounted 
in this paper, big political openings took place in the smallest states, notably Qatar 
and Bahrain. In contrast, the Arab world's most influential regimes (in Egypt, Syria 
and Saudi Arabia) made no significant move in favour of separation of executive, 
legislative and judicial power. This broader regional picture was reflected in the 
media landscape: Qatar's abolition of its Ministry of Information contrasted sharply 
with tight government controls exercised on the print and audiovisual media in other 
states. 
 
This study searched hard for good news stories showing how civil society players can 
hold those in power to account. In comparing the achievements of civil society groups 
promoting women's political participation, it identified two contexts (Palestinian and 
Moroccani) where perseverance in a multi-party system, with laws being drafted or 
reformed, brought some positive results. At least they appeared positive when 
compared with the outcome of similar campaigning in Egypt and Kuwait. Activists 
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involved in these struggles noted the importance of wider social development, fluid 
political relations, a well-established NGO sector, the positive impact of visible 
interim successes, and the importance of good relations with the press. As for the two 
cases (Syria and Bahrain) in which civil society groups were able, during specific 
periods, to squeeze some measurable concessions from the authorities, these owed 
something to external forces, including exiled dissidents campaigning in European 
capitals and the monitoring apparatus of UN human rights treaties and special 
rapporteurs.  
 
Ultimately, the most urgent reason for calling power-holders in the Arab region to 
account is the very lack of mechanisms for enforcing accountability. In other words 
there is a clear vicious circle. The possibilities for people in this region to hold those 
in power to account are circumscribed by autocratic modes of governance in which 
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